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MORTGAGES-CONSIDERATION AND A VALID
DEBT OR OBLIGATION-ARE EITHER OR
BOTH NECESSARY TO THE VALIDITY
OF A MORTGAGE?
I. INTRODUTION
The distinct questions of whether a debt or obligation which
a mortgage secures is a requisite to the validity of the mortgage
and whether a mortgage must be supported by sufficient consid-
eration are the subjects of a great diversity of opinion and a
good deal of confusion. This is reflected in some of the South
Carolina cases. This discussion is aimed at some degree of clari-
fication of the law as it stands in South Carolina on these two
questions. The situation contemplated in this note is the crea-
tion of a legal mortgage of real property as between the mort-
gagor and the mortgagee.
II. TisOBLGATION
It is generally agreed that a valid debt or obligation is essen-
tial to the existence of a mortgage' because "the idea of a mort-
gage is founded upon the conveyance being by way of security
for the payment of money or the like.. . ."-2 In the early South
Carolina case of Ne(aughrin &fi Company v. WilliamsB the court
affirmed the trial court's holding that a mortgage of land was
a valid security even though it recited a bond to be secured by
it, which bond was not executed, since there was in fact an in-
debtedness of the mortgagor to the mortgagee. The court quoted
from Jones' Mortgages of Real Property with approval: "The
validity of a mortgage does not depend upon the description of
the debt contained in the deed . .. it depends rather upon the
emistence of the debt it is given to secure."14 And in Duclworth
'v. MoKinney5 the court, in upholding the lower court's overrul-
1. E.g., Bitzenburg v. Bitzenburg, 360 Mo. 70, 226 S.W.2d 1017 (1950);
1. L. JONES, MORTGAGES OF REAL PROPERTY § 265, at 344 (7th ed. 1915); G.
OSBORNE, MORTGAGES § 103, at 246 (1951); 9 G. THomPsoN, REAL PROPERTY
§ 4745, at 380 (3. Grimes ed. repl. 1958); 5 H. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY
§ 1401, at 278 (3d ed. 1939).
2. 2 E. WASHBRN, REAL PROPERTY 46 (4th ed. 1876) ; see Note, The Val-
idity of a Mortgage Created as a Gift, 4 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 276, 280 (1930).
3. 15 S.C. 505 (1881).
4. Id. at 516-17 (emphasis added).
5. 58 S.C. 418, 36 S.E. 730 (1900).
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ing of a demurrer to the defendant's answer in a foreclosure
action, stated:
The contention on the part of the [plaintiff] that while fail-
ure [emphasis in the original] of consideration of an obliga-
tion under seal, may be set up as a defense to an action on
such an instrument, yet want of consideration cannot, as the
seal imports a consideration, cannot avail the [plaintiff] in
this case, for two reasons: 1st, Because the note, which con-
stitutes the substratum of plaintiff's action, was not an
instrument under seal-the allegation in the complaint being
that the note sued on is a "promissory note" [emphasis in
the original]. And if the note was without consideration,
then there was no debt, and if no debt, then there could be
no valid mortgage
0
The court had occasion to meet the issue squarely in Williams v.
Lawrene. The plaintiff had been given a mortgage by her
mother, purporting to secure a note, which she promptly re-
corded. The transaction was not, however, intended as genuine
but only to protect her mother's property from judgment
creditors, a threat which never materialized. There was no con-
sideration for the note nor was it under seal. It was consequently
unenforceable. The court affirmed the dismissal of the com-
plaint on the ground, inter alia, that "[a] mortgage is different
from other instruments in that, in order that it may be a valid
instrument, there must be a debt or obligation of the mortgagor
for which it is given to secure."" It is apparent from these cases
that the South Carolina view is in accord with the weight of
authority.9
It should be noted that the court in Williams'0 used the lan-
guage "debt or obligation of the mortgagor."" This would seem
to indicate that the obligation must be a personal obligation of
the mortgagor. There is authority, however, for the proposition
6. Id. at 426, 36 S.E. at 733 (emphasis added). The second reason was that
the defendant's answer really made out a defense of failure of consideration.
7. 194 S.C. 1, 8 S.E2d 838 (1940).
8. Id. at 11, 8 S.E2d at 842.
9. This may also be inferred from the statutory language: "[Tihe mortgagor
shall be deemed the owner of the land and the mortgagee as owner of the money
lent or due. . . ." S.C. CoDE AxN. § 45-51 (1962) (emphasis added).
10. 194 S.C. 1, 8 S.E.2d 838 (1940).
11. Id. at 11, 8 S.E2d at 842 (emphasis added).
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that the obligation need not be the personal obligation of the
mortgagor.12 This appears to be the rule in South Carolina.'3
Before leaving the discussion of the obligation underlying a
mortgage, it should be noted that the obligation need not be one
for which the mortgagor or the third person is personally liable.
The barring of a debt by a statute of limitations, for example,
does not affect the validity of the mortgage. 14 Nor does the
discharge of the maker of the note in personal bankruptcy dis-
charge the mortgage.'3 Finally, the alteration of a note which
has the effect of avoiding it has no effect on the mortgage
which secures the debt represented by the note.' 6
III. Tim CoNSIDmRATIoN
It is commonly asserted or assumed that a mortgage must be
supported by a sufficient consideration.'1 This is true of the
South Carolina decisions.' 8 Such assertions, however, are incor-
rect according to the leading writers.' 9 It is said that a common
law mortgage is a conveyance on condition subsequent and no
more requires consideration than any other executed transfer of
property.20 No different rule should apply where the mortgage
12. E.g., 5 H. TIFFANY, supra note 1 § 1404, at 282.
13. Staggs v. Bridgman, 232 S.C. 402, 102 S.E.2d 362 (1958); Theodore v.
Mozie 230 S.C. 216, 95 S.E.2d 173 (1956); Clanton v. Clanton, 229 S.C. 356,
92 S.E.2d 878 (1956); Greer Bank & Trust Co. v. Waldrop, 155 S.C. 47, 151
S.E. 920 (1930) (dictum); see G. OSBORNE, supra note 1 § 103, at 249; 5 H.
TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1404 (3d ed. 1939, Supp. 1967); Karesh, Security
Transactions, 1956-57 Survey of S.C. Law, 10 S.C.L.Q. 114, 123 (1957).
14. Nichols v. Briggs, 18 S.C. 473 (1883); see G. OSBORNE, supra note 1
§ 103, at 249; 5 H. TIFFANY, supra note 1 § 1404, at 283.
15. Nichols v. Briggs, 18 S.C. 473 (1883) (dictum) ; see G. OSBORNE, supra
note 1 § 103, at 250; 5 H. TIFFANY, supra note 1 § 1404, at 283.
16. Edwards v. Sartor, 69 S.C. 540, 48 S.E. 537 (1904); Smith v. Smith,
27 S.C. 166, 3 S.E. 78 (1887) ; Gillett v. Powell, Speers Eq. 142 (S.C. 1843) ;
see G. OSBORNE, supra note 1 § 103, at 250; 5 H. TIFFANY, sUpra note 1
§ 1404, at 283. "
17. E.g., Lee State Bank v. McElheny, 227 Mich. 322, 198 N.W. 928 (1924);
see 1 L. JoNEs, supra note I § 610, at 999; G. OSBORNE, supra note 1 § 107, at
262; 5 H. TIFFANY, supra note 1 § 1401, at 276; 1 C. WILTSIE, MORTGAGE FORE-
CLOSURE § 92, at 171 (5th ed. rev. 1939).
18. Jackson v. Walters, 246 S.C. 486, 144 S.E2d 422 (1965); Theodore v.
Mozie, 230 S.C. 216, 95 S.E.2d 173 (1956) ; Bandy v. Bandy, 187 S.C. 410, 197
S.E. 396 (1938); Bank of Charleston v. Oates, 160 S.C. 188, 158 S.E. 272
(1931) ; Greer Bank & Trust Co. v. Waldrop, 155 S.C. 47, 151 S.E. 920 (1930);
Nichols v. Andrews, 149 S.C. 1, 146 S.E. 610 (1929).
19. G. OSBORNE, supra note 1 § 107, at 261; 5 H. TIFFANY, supra note 1
§ 1401, at 277; W. WALSH, MORTGAGES § 14, at 74 (1934) ; 1 C. WILTsIE, supra
note 17 § 92, at 172.
20. National City Bank v. Wagner, 216 F. 473 (7th Cir. 1914) ; G. OSBORNE,
supra note 1 § 107, at 261; 5 H. TIFFANY, supra note 1 § 1401, at 277; W.
WALSH, supra note 19 § 14, at 74; Note, The Validity of a Mortgage Created
as a Gift, 4 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 276, 281 (1930) ; 8 Wis. L. REv. 184 (1932).
[Vol. 19
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gives a lien (as in South Carolina by statute) 21 since there is
no reason for the introduction of the doctrine of consideration
which is properly applicable to executory contracts only. A legal
mortgage, whether regarded as a conveyance on condition subse-
quent or as a lien, "is not an executory contract, it not in itself
involving any personal obligation. 2 2 That a mortgage is valid
without consideration is indicated by the fact that a mortgage
is valid even though given to secure a pre-existing debt of a
third person2" which, in the law of contracts, would be past con-
sideration-thus no consideration.
The failure to differentiate between the mortgage and the
obligation it secures is assigned as the most frequent source of
confusion. 24 Two reasons given for this are the use of "the word
mortgage to refer ... to the debt, the property security, or the
composite unit of the two" 25 and the requirement of an obliga-
tion, which makes the validity of the mortgage indirectly de-
pendent upon the consideration for the obligation which it
secures.26 Confusion resulting from this requirement is appar-
ently the reason for the rather frequent reference to the lending
of the money or other act which creates the debt or obligation as
the "consideration" for the mortgage.27 Many of the writers
and judges who have fallen into this habit recognize that "con-
sideration" in the mortgages context has a different meaning
from consideration in the law of contracts.28 In spite of this
they have gone further and brought a modified version of the
doctrine of consideration from contract law over into the law of
21. S.C. CODE ANN. § 45-51 (1962).
22. 5 H. TIFFANY, supra note 1 § 1401, at 277. See G. OSBORNE, .supra note
1 § 107, at 261 ; Note, Consideration in Mortgages, 19 Ky. L.J. 146, 154 (1931).
23. Greer Bank & Trust Co. v. Waldrop, 155 S.C. 47, 151 S.E. 920 (1930)
(dictum) ; Lawrence v. Hicks, 132 S.C. 370, 128 S.E. 720 (1925) ; Pierson v.
Green, 69 S.C. 559, 48 S.E. 624 (1904) ; Koster v. Welch, 57 S.C. 95, 35 S.E.
435 (1900) ; see G. OSBORNE, supra note 1 § 107, at 261 n. 78; 5 H. TIFFANY,
supra note 1 § 1401, at 277 n. 5; Karesh, Security Transactions, 1956-57 Survey
of S.C. Law, 10 S.C.L.Q. 114, 123-24 n. 27 (1957).
24. G. OSBORNE, supra note 1 § 107, at 262; Note, The Validity of a Mort-
gage Created as a Gift, 4 ST. JoHN's L. RLv. 276, 282 (1930).
25. G. OSBORNE, supra note 1 § 107, at 262.
26. Id.; W. WArsL, supra note 19 § 14, at 75.
27. See, e.g., Jackson v. Walters, 246 S.C. 486, 144 S.E.2d 422 (1965); 3
R. PoWELL, REAL PROPERTY 444 (P. Rohan ed. 1966) ; 9 G. THOMPSON, supra
note 1 § 4745, at 382; Note, Comideration in Mortgages, 19 Ky. L.J. 146, 147
(1931); Note, The Validity of a Mortgage Created as a Gift, 4 ST. JoHN's L.
R v. 276, 282 (1930).
28. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. National Grain Corp., 103 Conn. 657, 131
A. 404 (1925) ; 1 L. JoNES, supra note 1 § 611, at 1002; 3 R. PowELL, stupra
note 28 444, at 575.
4
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mortgages. Thus it is said: "[T]he mortgage is closely akin to
an ordinary contract as to which sufficient consideration must
be found. 29
It is not surprising, therefore, to find courts invoking the law
of sealed instruments to sustain a mortgage against an attack
on the ground of lack of a valid obligation. 0 As an example,
the South Carolina court, in Bandy v. Bandy,"1 said: "[W]here
a mortgage is executed with all the formalities required, under
seal, the party who executed it, would not be permitted to im-
peach it on the sole ground that it was without consideration"32
(that is, on the ground that there was no valid obligation for
which the mortgage was given to secure). And again in the
recent case of Jackson. v. Valters3 it was held that since the
mortgage was under seal, the court would not pass upon whether
there was "consideration" for the mortgage.8 4 Since one of the
requirements for the creation of a legal mortgage in South Caro-
lina is that it be under seal,85 the court seemed to be saying, in
effect, that there is no requirement in South Carolina that the
mortgage be given to secure a debt or obligation. This position
does not appear to be reconcilable with that of the court in cases
such as Duckwort 8 6 and Viliams 37 which, as previously noted,
indicate that a valid debt or obligation to be secured is indeed
an essential requirement of a mortgage.88 Further, the court, in
Duckworth,"9 discussing the plaintiff's contention that the seal
29. 3 R. POWELL, supra note 28 ff 444, at 575. One writer goes so far as to
say: "A mortgage, like every other contract, must be founded on a valuable
consideration." 1 L. JoNs, supra note 1 § 610, at 999 (emphasis added).
30. Jackson v. Walters, 246 S.C. 486, 144 S.E2d 422 (1965) (note and mort-
gage); Bandy v. Bandy, 187 S.C. 410, 197 S.E. 396 (1938) (note and mort-
gage); Bank of Charelston v. Oates, 160 S.C. 188, 158 S.E. 272 (1931) (bond
and mortgage) ; see 1 L. JoNas, supra note 1 § 613, at 1006; 5 H. TIFFANY,
supra note 1 § 1401, at 276 n. 3; 1 C. WLTSIE, supra note 17 § 101, at 185.
31. 187 S.C. 410, 197 S.E. 396 (1938).
32. Id. at 413, 197 S.E. at 397. The result is correct as the court also held
that the defendant had not proved lack of "consideration."
33. 246 S.C. 486, 144 S.E.2d 422 (1965).
34. As in Bandy, there were other grounds for the decision which justified
the result.
35. Arthur v. Screven, 39 S.C. 77 (1893). Of course, a mortgage without a
seal may still be effective as an equitable mortgage. Id.
36. 58 S.C. 418, 36 S.E. 730 (1900).
37. 194 S.C. 1, 8 S.E.2d 838 (1940).
38. Note that in several cases where lack of "consideration" was pleaded in
a foreclosure action, the court looked into the matter of "consideration" in spite
of its aforementioned assertions that the seal on the mortgage imports consid-
eration. Carsten v. Wilson, 241 S.C. 516, 129 S.E.2d 431 (1963); Pennell &
Harley, Inc. v. Harris, 210 S.C. 504, 43 S.E.2d 490 (1947).
39. 58 S.C. 418, 36 S.E. 730 (1900).
[Vol. 19
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imports "consideration" (apparently referring to the seal on the
mortgage since the note secured was not under seal), summarily
dismissed the contention without any reference at all to the seal
on the mortgage.
It should be noted that even though there is no consideration
for the obligation which the mortgage purports to secure, if the
obligation itself is sealed, it is a valid obligation as the seal
imports consideration, 40 and the mortgage likewise is valid.
41
Thus, in cases where the obligation is represented by a bond,
which from its very nature is, at common law, usually an instru-
ment under seal,4 2 the obligation is valid regardless of the lack
of consideration. Failure of consideration, however, may be
shown even though the obligation is under seal.43 For example,
in Koster v. Welch44 a mortgage purporting to secure a simul-
taneously executed bond in the amount of $480 was delivered
to the plaintiff together with the bond. The mortgagor was
indebted to the mortgagee for $380 but the other $100 was never
advanced. In a foreclosure action, the court held that, although
the defendant would not have been allowed to show that the
bond was without consideration, he could show failure of con-
sideration in the amount of $100. 45
IV. G=at MORTGAGES
It is not at all clear whether a mortgage executed by way of
a gift, without any debt or obligation which it secures, is valid.40
There are occasional decisions holding that a mortgage may be
the subject of a gift.47 Jones, in his treatise, asserts that "[a]
mortgage may be made by way of gift, when the rights of
creditors are not thereby interfered with." 48 On the other hand,
40. Carter v. King, 11 Rich. 125 (S.C. 1857).
41. See Koster v. Welch, 57 S.C. 95, 35 S.E. 435 (1900); 5 H. TIFFANY,
supra note 1 § 1401, at 279.
42. Boyd v. Boyd, 2 Nott & McC. 125 (S.C. 1819).
43. Bank of Charleston v. Oates, 160 S.C. 188, 158 S.E. 272 (1931).
44. 57 S.C. 95, 35 S.E. 435 (1900).
45. The court pointed out, however, that the plaintiff had not asked that the
$100 be included in the judgment of foreclosure.
46. The situation contemplated is entirely different from that of a gift of a
valid mortgage by one who is not the mortgagor. See Note, A Mortgage as a
Gift, 36 Ky. L.J. 121 (1947).
47. E.g., Goethe v. Gmelin, 256 Mich. 112, 239 N.W. 347 (1931). See G.
OSBORNE, supra note 1 § 103, at 251; 5 H. TIFFANY, supra note 1 § 1401, at
279; W. WALsH, supra note 19 § 14, at 74; 1. C. WImrSIE, Vtpra note 17 § 92,
at 172.
48. 1 L. JONS, supra note 1 § 614, at 1007.
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there is authority that a mortgage cannot be created by way of
a gift because a mortgage cannot exist without an obligation
which it secures. 49 These seemingly conflicting positions can be
reconciled, it is said, on the basis of intention of the parties
when the mortgage was executed.5" If the parties intended that
the mortgage secure a debt or obligation, a valid debt or obliga-
tion is essential to the validity of the mortgage, but not other-
wise. Some courts appear to have accepted this reasoning,51 and
others have rejected it.52 It has been suggested that, since it is
undesirable to have an impasse where neither party can use the
property, and since the courts should not aid an "Indian giver,"
the partly-perfected, intended gift should be completed.53 This
idea has been criticized on the ground that "the intention was
not to give the property itself but some other performance with
the property meant merely as security for that other intended
benefit."
54
The court in South Carolina apparently has not had occasion
to deal with the problem of a mortgage intended as a gift other
than in a case in which creditors of the mortgagor-donor, to
whom he was indebted at the time the mortgage was executed,
were resisting foreclosure.5 5 In that case it was said:
[T]he giving of a mortgage to secure the payment of a so-
called debt is a very unusual way of making a gift. ....
Whatever doubts may have been entertained as to the right
of the heirs or devisees of [the mortgagor]-mere volunteers
- to resist foreclosure of a mortgage, we cannot for a
moment suppose that anyone acquainted, in the least degree,
with settled principles of law, would have doubted the right
of creditors to do so.5"
49. E.g., Tyler v. Wright, 122 Me. 558, 119 A. 583 (1923) ; see G. OSBORNE,
supra note 1 § 103, at 246 n. 11. It has already been noted that, under the law
of sealed instruments, a sealed obligation executed as a gift would be valid so
that a mortgage given to secure the obligation would be valid also. See text
accompanying notes 40 and 41 supra.
50. G. OSBORNE, supra note 1 § 104, at 252; 31 MIcir. L. Rav. 102 (1932).
See W. WALSn, supra note 19 § 16, at 80, 81.
51. E.g., Brigham v. Brown, 44 Mich. 59, 6 N.W. 97 (1880) ; see 31 MICH.
L. REV. 102 (1932).
52. E.g., Coon v. Shry, 209 Cal. 612, 289 P. 815 (1930); see 31 MIcH. L.
REV. 102 (1932).
53. 1 G. GLENN, MORTGAGES § 5.6, at 34 (1943).
54. 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 16.65, at 125 (AJ. Casner ed. 1952).
55. Gardner v. Gardner, 49 S.C. 62, 26 S.E. 1001 (1897).
56. Id. at 75, 26 S.E. at 1006.
[Vol. 19
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Although there has been no particular discussion of the valid-
ity of gift mortgages in South Carolina, the court has, on sev-
eral occasions, as previously mentioned, indicated that, since a
mortgage is an instrument under seal, it would not look into the
question of lack of "consideration" (that is, obligation
secured).57 On the other hand, there are the cases which hold
that a valid obligation is essential to the existence of a mort-
gage.58 In view of this apparent conflict together with the lack
of decided cases, it would be very difficult presently to make
any statement as to what the law is in South Carolina with
regard to gift mortgages.
V. CONCLUSIONS
It is submitted that the cases in which the South Carolina
court has applied the law of sealed instruments to preclude any
showing of lack of an obligation secured by the mortgage are
weakened by the fact that in every such case there were alter-
nate holdings or other grounds on which the decision could have
been based. Therefore, should the court be faced with the ques-
tion again, these cases present no particular obstacle to an ad-
herence to the general rule recognized and followed in South
Carolina that the validity of the mortgage depends upon the
validity of the obligation secured thereby.
As for gift mortgages, the better view, which can be reconciled
with this general rule, seems to be that of looking to the inten-
tion of the parties to determine the validity of such mortgages.
Jom M. HARRINGTON
57. Jackson v. Walters, 246 S.C. 486, 144 S.E.2d 422 (1965) ; Bandy v. Bandy,
187 S.C. 410, 197 S.E. 396 (1938) ; Bank of Charleston v. Oates, 160 S.C. 188,
158 S.E. 272 (1931).
58. Williams v. Lawrence, 194 S.C. 1, 8 S.E.2d 838 (1940); Duckworth v.
McKinney, 58 S.C. 418, 36 S.E. 730 (1900) ; McCaughrin & Co. v. Williams,
15 S.C. 505 (1881) (dictum).
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